Introduction
Psychological essentialism is a prominent view within contemporary developmental psychology and cognitive science according to which children have an innate commitment to essentialism. If this view is correct then a commitment to essentialism is an important aspect of human nature rather than a culturally specific commitment peculiar to those who have received a specific philosophical or scientific education.
1
In this article my concern is to explore the philosophical significance of psychological essentialism with respect to the relationship between the content of our concepts and thoughts and the nature of the extra-cranial world. I will argue that, despite first appearances, psychological essentialism undermines a form of externalism that has become commonplace in the philosophy of mind and language.
Psychological Essentialism
As its name suggests, psychological essentialism is related to the traditional philosophical doctrine of essentialism.
2 One can draw a rough distinction between two versions of essentialism. According to the first, many of the individual things that 1 populate the world have essences, where an essence is a property (or collection of properties) that is central to the identity of that thing so that it couldn't lose the property without ceasing to exist. For example, it might be claimed that it is part of my essence that I am human but not part of my essence that I am an academic philosopher. Call this essentialism with respect to individuals. According to the second version of essentialism, it is categories of things that have essences. For example, in order to belong to the category HUMAN it is essential to be a mammal.
This leaves it open as to whether any individual human is essentially human or as to whether any particular thing has an essence as such (as opposed to an essence relative to a particular category to which they belong). Call this doctrine essentialism with respect to categories.
3
Psychological essentialism is a view within developmental psychology -and cognitive science more widely -that has come to prominence over the last two decades. In its boldest form it is the view that children are innately essentialist with respect to many of the categories for which they have concepts. For example, in virtue of an innate commitment to essentialism, a child who has acquired the concept DOG thinks of dogs as being bound together by a hidden essence so that any dog is a dog in virtue of possessing the relevant essence. Put this way, the implication would appear to be that children are, first and foremost, essentialists about categories as opposed to individuals. 4 Essences are conceived of as being hidden and causally responsible for the observable properties of things. Due to this causal connection categorising things 3 See Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism, (Cheshum: Acumen, 2002) and Mackie, How Things Might Have Been, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) for a more detailed account of this distinction.
on the basis of their observable properties will generally result in their being assigned to categories to which they belong. However, such a procedure falls short of being foolproof as, for example, something could appear to be a dog without being a dog and something could appear not to be a dog whilst being a dog. Typically, psychological essentialists regard children as holding a placeholder conception of essence; that is, children do not usually have any substantial views as to the precise nature of the essences of the categories that they adopt an essentialist attitude towards. 5 With respect to the breadth of childhood essentialism there is considerable disagreement. Keil 6 argues that childhood essentialism is restricted to the biological domain. Gelman 7 thinks that children are essentialist about a wider domain of reality that includes the psychological and substances such as water but does not include artefacts. And Bloom 8 holds that children are even essentialist with respect to artefacts such as coffee pots and works of art. What is important to appreciate is that as the psychological essentialist is making a claim about the metaphysical commitments of children she is not thereby committing herself to the truth of essentialism qua metaphysical doctrine. Keil showed children and adults a picture of a racoon. When asked these subjects answered that the picture was of a racoon. They were then told that the pictured animal underwent a series of changes including changes to its appearance (through fur-dying and plastic surgery), the insertion of a smell sac, and modifications to its behaviour. They were then presented with a picture of an animal resembling a skunk and told that it was of the original animal post-modification. When asked about the identity of the animal at this stage children over the age of seven and adults systematically answered that it was a racoon despite its appearance indicating that for them something's being a racoon is a matter of its origins and/or hidden nature rather than its observable properties.
In this paper my concern is to not to evaluate the evidence for psychological essentialism but, rather, to determine the philosophical significance of the doctrine. 
5
The particular philosophical issue that I will focus on is that concerning the relationship between the contents of an individual's mind and the world external to her skull. 
Externalism
According to externalism the relationship between the contents of an individual's mind and the world beyond her outer surfaces goes beyond the mere causal. Rather, the very identity of the concepts and thoughts she has will depend on the nature of the external world that she is embedded in. Consequently, it is in principle possible for two individuals to be molecule for molecule replicas (or identical in terms of their intrinsic physical properties) yet have divergent concepts and thoughts due to the fact that they inhabit quite different environments. Externalism, contrasts with internalism.
Internalists reject the view that there exists this non-casual relationship between the mind and the external world. As will become clear, it is important to rectify this situation as I will now do. Putnam assumes that the word 'water' (along with 'gold', 'tiger' and 'lemon') is a natural kind term. What makes it a natural kind term is not merely the fact that most of the samples of liquid that members of the English speaking community characterize as 'water' belong to a common natural kind. All those samples also share certain superficial properties and there is in principle nothing to stop there being a word with a meaning such it that applies to something if and only if that thing has certain superficial properties. What is crucial to a word's being a natural kind term is the state of mind of its users; they must have relevant intentions and make relevant assumptions. This is brought out at several points in the 'Meaning of "meaning"'. when Archimedes asserted that something was gold . . . he was not just saying that it had the superficial characteristics of gold . . . ; he was saying that it had the same general hidden structure (the same 'essence', so to speak) as any normal piece of local gold.
In fact, Putnam thinks that related intentions and assumptions are in place with respect to words that are normally contrasted with natural kind terms, for example, those, such as 'pencil', that name types of artefacts:
When we use the word 'pencil' we intend to refer to whatever has the same nature as the normal examples of the local pencils in the actual world. or if they didn't recognize the existence of experts and intend to defer to their judgement with respect to the application of words. concept DOG might be a representation of the dog I had as a child so when I seek to determine whether something that I have encountered is a DOG I do so by working out whether it is sufficiently similar to the dog I had as a child.
Externalism and cognitive science
With respect to externalism, a key point about prototype and exemplar theories of concepts is that they don't sit too happily with that doctrine. For, it would appear that the prototypes or exemplars in the head of Oscar and Oscar2 will be indistinguishable implying that the twins express the same concepts by means of the word 'water' (for, recall, prototypes and exemplars tend to represent observable properties). Thus, if one wants one's view of concepts and thoughts to be empirically motivated then it seems that one shouldn't be too impressed by externalist thought experiments.
One obvious reply to this is to say that psychologists who work on concepts are primarily interested in the mechanisms by means of which we categorise things and the internal processes by means of which we manipulate the representations associated with our concepts. On this front there is no difference between Oscar and Oscar2. Nevertheless, if concepts are involved in delivering us knowledge about the external world then the identity of the external items that they refer to will be of crucial importance and with respect to this Putnam did establish something important.
For, he established that no matter how similar Oscar and Oscar2's prototypes are, as they were constructed in response to samples of different types of stuff they support the possession of concepts that diverge in their reference or extension. in the prototypes in their respective heads so one might equally say that those prototypes were constructed in response to the same type of stuff as belonging to the relevant type is a matter of observable rather than hidden properties. In other words, the externalist has no right to regard the twins' concepts as being natural kind concepts. After all, if the prototype theory is correct then determining whether something falls under a given concept will typically done on the basis of a consideration of its observable properties.
It might be objected that the above point ignores that very aspect of Putnam's line of thought that I have sought to emphasise. This is the idea that when ostensively defining 'water' an individual points at a sample of water and resolves to apply the term 'water' only to stuff bearing the same L to the ostended sample. My response to this objection is that from the point of view of someone who advocates the prototype theory of concepts this represents a mistaken view of how concepts are acquired.
Either, a child acquiring concepts doesn't think of what she interacts with in the manner of the individual in Putnam's scenario or if she does her doing so doesn't enter into the nature and identity of those concepts.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)) endorses a two-factor theory of concepts.
Psychological Essentialism Again
It is at this point that psychological essentialism becomes relevant for it offers an empirically motivated theory that challenges key aspects of prototype and exemplar theories of concepts and would appear to sit more happily with externalism. Indeed, as both Gelman 26 and Carey 27 point out, psychological essentialism was partly motivated by Putnam and Kripke's reflections.
Psychological essentialism implies that with respect to many of their concepts children think that the items that those concepts group together share a hidden essence in virtue of which they fall under the concept in question. Thus, for example, falling under the concept DOG is a matter of having the relevant hidden properties rather than having any superficial properties that dogs typically have. Hence, form the child's perspective, something can appear to be a dog without being a dog and something can be a dog without appearing to be being a dog. This is inconsistent with the prototype theory as that theory implies that the concept DOG is such that being a dog is wholly a matter of satisfying a prototype made up of features that are both readily observable and statistically salient in the child's environment.
According to psychological essentialism the relevant hidden properties are often not known by the child who thinks of them as being a matter of how things in the external world really are in and of themselves. 
Psychological Essentialism and Externalism
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that the relationship between psychological essentialism and externalism isn't as clear-cut as I have thus far implied. Rather, psychological essentialism serves to undermine the kind of externalism that is commonplace in contemporary philosophy of mind. This is not to say that psychological essentialism implies that externalism is false; rather, that the way in which the external world determines the contents of our concepts and thoughts is severely constrained and directed by our underlying mental states. Consequently, an individual's mental states play a more substantial role in determining the content of her concepts and thoughts than is recognized by orthodox externalists. In arguing for this conclusion I will tend to focus on natural language words but my reasoning applies just as much to the concepts expressed by such words. I will do this for ease of exposition and to maintain consistency with Putnam's description of his externalism.
To explore the issue I will begin by considering a problem that Devitt and Sterelny 29 raise for a purely causal theory of reference. Recall that one of Putnam's 28 None of this is to say that the psychological essentialist is compelled to deny the existence of prototypes. For, she can accept that such structures exist and are routinely employed in making categorization decisions on the hoof so long as she resists identifying them with the concepts that they so help deploy.
targets was the description theory of reference and (along with Kripke) he is often characterized as wishing to replace such a position with a causal theory. Now, consider an individual pointing at a sample of water and saying 'I'll call that type of stuff "water"' (or, alternatively, pointing at a dog and saying 'I'll call that kind of thing "dog"'). The problem is that the sample or token in question doesn't just belong to the type water (or dog) but to many others. Devitt and Sterelny suggest that the correct response to the qua-problem is to retreat from a purely causal theory of reference and adopt a causal-descriptive theory instead.
Accordingly, although 'water' and 'dog' got their reference partly as a result of interactions with samples of water and dogs this fact alone wasn't enough to secure their reference. In addition, the individual ostensively defining these words had an appropriate description in mind: she thought of what she was attempting to name as being a natural kind whose tokens tend to have particular observable properties.
One comment on this line of thought is that it seems to cohere well with Putnam's own. That is, he is not arguing for a pure-causal theory as he portrays the individual ostensively defining 'water' as intending to use that word to refer only to samples of stuff that bear the 'same L relationship' to the sample she points at. Moreover, he represents the individual as having a 'stereotype' in mind that she associates with the word in question. So his point is not so much to establish a pure casual theory of reference but to undermine the idea that an individual's internal mental states are the sole determinants of the reference and meaning of the words on her lips.
Nevertheless, the qua-problem does gesture towards something that I think is very important with respect to the viability of externalism and its relationship to psychological essentialism. Both the terms and concepts 'water'/WATER and 'milk'/MILK are prominent in our linguistic and mental lives and it is important that a child acquires them early in her development, something that a typical child can be expected to do. Now imagine an individual pointing at a sample of milk whilst saying 'milk' alongside the intention to use that word in future only to refer to stuff that bears the same L relation to the stuff before her. What meaning will she have bestowed upon 'milk'? What concept Rather, she has a neutral or unarticulated idea of the relation. But this gives rise to an indeterminacy problem: why would the naming ceremony privilege the attribution of the meaning milk to 'milk' (and the acquisition of the concept MILK) rather than an alternative meaning relating to physico-chemical properties? Here, unlike the kind of cases that Devitt and Sterelny discuss, appeal to a stereotype or in-head description relating to observable properties won't help to disambiguate the pointing act. Let me explain why. When the individual points at a dog she is also pointing at a mammal.
So what meaning is attributed to the word 'dog' at the naming ceremony? Is it dog or 30 M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, Language and Reality, op. cit..
is it mammal? It seems that the stereotype or description in the head of the individual settles this question at least to the extent that it rules out mammal. For the description will refer to properties that dogs tend to have but that mammals in general don't have so that the description or stereotype will 'fit' dogs in general in a manner in which it won't fit mammals in general. Another way of putting this is to say that the description would serve in the identification of detection of dogs but not of mammals in general. As we have seen, to say this fits well with Putnam's picture. But in the case of the sample of milk such a move won't help. Any stereotype or in-head description will fit the physico-chemical kind just as much as it fits milk as anything that is like the ostended sample at that level will share the kind of observable properties that will figure in the stereotype or in-head description.
The upshot of this is that if the individual operates with an unarticulated notion of the nature of the same L relation then she is not going to be successful in attributing a determinate meaning or reference to 'milk' or in acquiring a determinate concept when she attempts to bestow meaning on that word.
But the same holds with respect to 'water'. The sample of water ostended in the will fall under a concept that binds together samples of liquid that have a common origin, 'lifestyle' and role in human life and life in general. One might describe this as the concept of a liquid that fills rivers and streams, falls as rain, comes out of taps, and is fundamental to the survival of most living things. Earlier I argued that MILK is a bio-functional concept. With respect to the concept I am now describing, it might be described as a functional concept. Call this concept FWATER. In the environment of the individual ostensively defining 'water' everything that falls under FWATER also falls under the concept WATER and vice versa. However, the concepts are not co-extensive as the XYZ on Twin Earth falls under FWATER though it is not water. I now want to consider a potential objection to my line of argument. This draws upon essentialism as a doctrine about particulars as opposed to categories. The idea is that although the sample of liquid that figures in the ostensive definition of 'water' is both water and fwater it is essentially the former and only contingently the later. It is this difference that explains why 'water' has the meaning water rather than fwater bestowed upon it. Thus there is no need to demand of the individual that she has a richly articulated notion of the same L relation.
I have three points to make in response to this objection. First, it runs the risk of making it a mystery as to how 'milk' means what it does and how we acquire the concept MILK. For, if the essence of a sample of water relates to its microstructure then why doesn't the essence of a sample of milk? One might respond by saying that the essential function of milk relates to biology (that it is produced within the bodies of biological systems for the use of their offspring) so making milk a biological kind and so something in the scientific domain. Whereas, fwater isn't a biological kind but more of an artefactual kind so falling outside of the scientific domain. However, I'm not convinced by this as the essential function of fwater partly relates to its usage by biological systems whose survival depends upon it and which have evolved to utilize it. So why isn't fwater a biological kind? Moreover, if it is conceded that FWATER is an artefactual concept it might be pointed out that some prominent psychological essentialists 31 argue that our innate essentialist commitments cover the artefactual so that there is an empirical basis for thinking that a particular can have an artefactual essence.
My second point is that such an essentialism about particulars is hardly mandatory.
Thus the advocate of this objection needs to produce some justification for it. Such a justification isn't going to come from developmental psychology as psychological essentialists are quite clear that our innate essentialist commitments relate to categories and kinds and not particulars. Thus, there is little empirical support for the claim that it is part of our innate metaphysical perspective on the world that particulars have essences. And even if it were that wouldn't be much help given that, as indicated in the previous paragraph, psychological essentialists often argue that our essentialist commitments spread beyond the domain of physics and biology. This implies that if empirical work in developmental psychology is invoked to settle the issue there is the real prospect that it will support the claim that from the perspective of the typical human the essence of a particular thing that is an artefact relates to its being an artefact as much as its falling under any kind recognized by science.
A third point is that we have to make sense of how all of the words that we use mean what they mean, of why all of our concepts have the content that they have. As we have plenty of words that refer to artefacts and as the acquisition of many artefactual concepts is fundamental to a child's development the advocate of the objection under discussion runs the risk of making a mystery of how we could have such words and concepts. were to describe someone as 'disinterested' they would be saying that they were uninterested rather that unbiased. This would be so regardless of the meaning of the word in the wider community and even if the individual intended to mean by 'disinterested' just what everyone else meant. In sum then, the familiar phenomena of failing to understand the meaning of a word and misunderstanding a word that one uses suggest that for an individual's linguistic knowledge and concepts to line up with those of her fellows considerable demands are placed on her underlying mental states.
None of this is to deny the existence of a division of linguistic labour. Suppose I can't tell elms from beeches. I can till mean different things by the words 'elm' and 'beech' and mean what the experts mean by them. But that this is the case requires me to meet various conditions. I know that 'elm' and 'beech' name distinct species of trees and so employ the concepts TREE and SPECIES in connection with those words. I think that the respective species picked out by 'elm' and 'beech' are different in ways broadly similar to those in which oaks and sycamores (which I can tell apart) differ. Hence, I think they differ with respect to leaf shape, size, DNA, evolutionary history, and such like. I also accept that there are experts and would defer to them but I have some idea about what makes an expert an expert, how to find one, and the kinds of techniques they would use. So it would seem that the divide between me and the experts isn't so extreme and that to avail myself of the division of linguistic labour I have to have quite a rich body of specific mental states.
My second reply is that the objection doesn't sit very well with practice in developmental psychology where it is taken as a real possibility that individuals undergo conceptual development as they mature. Thus, for example, a developmental psychologist might argue that the concept that a typical five year old child expresses by means of the word 'cause' differs from that expressed by a typical ten year old when she uses 'cause', which in turn differs from that expressed by a typical adult when she uses 'cause'. But if the power of the wider linguistic community to enter into the mind of the individual is as great as the objection implies, then such conceptual development is an impossibility. But rejecting the coherence of orthodox developmental psychology seems to me to be too high a cost of endorsing the objection under consideration.
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that, despite first appearances, psychological essentialism undermines the kind of externalist view of the content of our concepts and thoughts that has become commonplace in the philosophy of mind and language. This a consequence of the psychological essentialist's emphasis on a range of concepts that includes those of biological phenomena and artefacts as well as those of types of physical stuff. If a child is to acquire such a wide range of concepts then she will need to have at her disposal a range of articulated notions of essence and bring the relevant notion of essence to bear in each particular case. For example, the articulated notion of essence that she will need to deploy in acquiring the concept WATER will be different from that that she needs to deploy in acquiring the concept MILK.
Without the appropriate articulated notions of essence a child will not acquire these concepts no matter how much water and milk she interacts with. This is not to say that the extra-cranial world plays no role in determining the contents of our thoughts and concepts but the extent to which it does is severely constrained and directed by our internal mental states.
